Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
December 5, 2009
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Colonel Michael Meese
Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences
CC:
Colonel Cindy Jebb
Professor and Deputy Head Dept of Social Sciences
SUBJECT:
After
Action Report—General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret)
VISIT TO KUWAIT AND AFGHANISTAN – 10-18 November 2009
1.
PURPOSE:
This
memo provides a strategic and operational assessment of security operations in
Afghanistan.
Be glad to conduct a Faculty Seminar and Cadet
Class lectures based on this report during this
spring semester.
2.
SOURCES:
A. SENIOR
MILITARY OFFICIALS:
1.)
General David Petraeus, Commander, United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM).
2.)
General Stanley McChrystal, Commanding General, International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and US
Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
3.)
LTG William Caldwell, Commanding General, NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan.
4.)
LTG Jim Dutton (UK), Deputy Commanding General, NATO ISAF
Headquarters, Kabul.
5.)
MG Mike Scaparotti, Commanding General, ISAF Regional Command
(East), Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF)-82.
6.)
MG Dick Formica, Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command
(CSTC)-A.
7.)
MG Peter Vangjel, Deputy Commanding General, Third Army/United States Army
Central.
8.)
MG John Macdonald, Deputy Commanding General, USFOR-A.
9.)
RADM Greg Smith, Director of Strategic Communications, ISAF/USFOR-A.
10.) MG Mike Flynn, Director of Intelligence,
CJ2, ISAF.
11.) MG Bill Mayville, ISAF Director of
Strategic Plans and Assessment (CJ3).
12.) MG Nick Carter, (UK), Commander, ISAF
Regional Command-South (RC-S).
1
2
13.) MG Stephen Mueller, USAF, Director, Air
Component Coordination Element (ACCE), HQ ISAF.
14.) BG Mark Martins, Interim Commander,
Task Force 435, US Theater Internment Facility-Afghanistan.
15.) BG Anne Macdonald, Afghan National Police
Development.
16.) BG Ben Hodges, Director of
Operations, RC-SOUTH, Kandahar.
17.) BG Guy Walsh, Commander, 451st Wing.
18.) BG John Nicholson, Commander, RC-SOUTH,
Camp Leatherneck.
19.) BG Kurt Fuller, Deputy Commanding
General – Operations, CJTF-82.
20.) BG Gregory Touhill, USAF, Chief, Office of
Military Cooperation – Kuwait.
21.) BG Thomas Murray, USMC, Deputy
Commander, International Security Assistance Force, RC-
SOUTH.
22.) COL (P) KK Chinn, Deputy Commanding
General – Support, CJTF-82.
23.) COL Brian Drinkwine, Commander, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.
24.) COL Harry Tunnell, Brigade Commander, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat
Team, 2nd Infantry Division.
25.) COL Michael Howard, Brigade Commander, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division.
26.) COL Eric Kurilla, Commander, Ranger
Regiment, Camp Alpha, Bagram.
27.) COL Randy Copeland, Task Force-714 J3,
Camp Alpha, Bagram.
28.) COL Kimberly Rapacz, Deputy Chief of Staff,
G-3, 335th Signal Command, Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait.
29.) COL Dennis Cahill, Chief, Development
Information Operations (LOO), CJTF-82, CJ7.
30.) COL Kevin Palgutt, Military Police,
Senior Advisor to the Minister of Interior.
31.) COL Tom Umberg, CSTC-A
(Anti-Corruption Strategy).
32.) LTC Amy Cook, Commander, Joint Task
Force Lone Star, (Bagram Detention Center).
33.) LTC James Coote (UK), Distinguished Service
Order (DSO), Military Assistant to COM RC-SOUTH,
ISAF.
B.
INTERMEDIATE JOINT COMMAND BRIEFING:
1.)
MG Jacques DeChevallier (FR), Deputy Commanding General.
2.)
MG Colin Boag (UK), Chief of Staff.
3.)
MG Mike Regner, USMC, Chief of Operations.
4.)
BG Alberto Corres (SP), Chief of Staff, Stability Operations.
5.)
BG Stephen Bowes (UK), Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs.
3
6.)
RDML (S) Paul Becker, CJ2.
7.)
COL Wayne Grigsby, Deputy Chief of Staff.
8.)
COL Marty Schweitzer, XO to the Commander.
C. ISAF STRATEGIC ADVISORY GROUP:
1.)
COL Kevin Owens, Director.
2.)
COL Chris Kolenda.
3.)
COL Hal Douquet.
4.)
CDR Jeff Eggers.
5.)
Mr. Greg Ryckman.
D. AFGHAN OFFICIALS:
1.) Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense.
2.)
Mohamad Hanif Atmar, Minister of Interior.
3.)
General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Chief of Staff of Afghan National Army.
4.)
MG Muhammad Raheem Wardak, Commanding General, 201st Corps, Afghan National
Army.
5.)
Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Co-Director, Institute for State Effectiveness; former
Afghan Minister of Finance.
6.)
Shahmahmood Miakhel, former Deputy Interior Minister of
Afghanistan.
E.
DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS:
1.)
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan.
2.)
Ambassador Deborah Jones, US Ambassador to Kuwait.
3.)
Ambassador Frank Ricciardonne, Deputy Chief of Mission.
4.)
Ambassador Tony Wayne, Coordinating Director for Development and
Economic Affairs.
5.)
Ambassador Mark Sedwill, UK Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.
6.) Ambassador (Ret.) William Taylor, Vice President, Peace
& Stability Operations, US Institute of Peace.
7.)
Core Country Team Brief.
8.)
Mr. Robert Watkins, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
General, UN Advisory Mission-
Afghanistan.
9.)
Mr. William Frej, Mission Director, US Agency for International Development
(USAID).
4
10.) Ms. Annie Pforzheimer, Political Counselor,
US Embassy, Kabul.
11.) Mr. Mike Spangler, Economic Counselor, US
Embassy, Kabul.
F. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS:
DEA/FBI/Treasury Briefing – US
Embassy, Kabul:
1.)
Mr. Jay Fitzpatrick, Assistant Regional Director, DEA.
2.)
Mr. Bob Jones, FBI Legal Attaché.
3.)
Mr. Keith Weiss, DEA.
4.)
Mr. Jeff Silk, DEA.
5.)
Mr. Kirk Meyer, Afghan Threat Finance Cell.
6.)
LTC Joe Myers, USFOR-A LNO.
3.
CONTEXT:
·
This report
is based on a series of briefings at the United States Embassy in Kuwait,
ARCENT HQS at Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait ---and then subsequent field
tactical observations in Afghanistan (ISAF, Afghan Government
officials, UNAMA, USFOR-A, US Embassy Kabul,
RC-South Kandahar, RC-East Bagram) at the invitation of
General David Petraeus, Commander, USCENTCOM and
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander,
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and US Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
·
It was an
honor to again assess the current challenges in Afghanistan. This report is
based on personal research,
data provided in-country during this trip, and
first-hand observations gained during my many field visits to
Pakistan, Kuwait, and Afghanistan during the
period 2003 forward to the current situation.
·
The
conclusions are solely my own as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
at West Point and should be
viewed as an independent civilian academic
contribution to the national security debate. No one in CENTCOM or
the ISAF Command in Afghanistan has vetted this
report.
·
These
observations focus on Afghanistan and the way forward. They do not center on Pakistan or the
US
domestic political challenge.
·
The
President’s Afghanistan Strategy Speech at West Point was coherent, logical,
and sincere. It was the end
result of a very deliberative and thoughtful
analytical review of the situation in Afghanistan and our several
unpalatable options. It was an appropriate political statement which delivered
resources to his field commander
and explained why the Commander-in-Chief would
not downsize or withdraw---and face the short term political
and military disaster that would immediately
ensue.
·
There is
precious little support for the Afghan operation among the American
people. 66% say it is not worth
fighting for. Only 45% of Americans and few among his political party
approve of President Obama’s handling
of the war. This was not a speech on military
strategy. We are unlikely to achieve our political and military goals
in 18 months. This will inevitably become a three to ten year strategy to
build a viable Afghan state with their
own security force that can allow us to
withdraw. It may well cost us an additional $300 billion and we are likely
to suffer thousands more US casualties.
5
·
One of the
most important concerns of American national security policy in the short run
is arguably the stability
of Pakistan. Pakistan is four nations under one weak federal
government. Only the Pakistani
Army is a load
bearing bureaucracy. The Pak Army is
disciplined, under-resourced, and courageous. The Pak Army is also the
Frontier Corps, the Intelligence Service (ISI),
and the most respected and trusted institution in the country. They
are also the guardians of Pakistan’s 70-90
nuclear weapons. They have only
tenuous control over much of the
country.
·
We are very
vulnerable in our Afghanistan operation. 90% of our Afghanistan logistics comes
through the Port of
Karachi and runs a dangerous thousand miles of
wild country on “jingle trucks” headed to the Bagram or
Kandahar Logistics Bases. Pakistani success in
maintaining internal stability and economic growth is vital to our
continued operations in Afghanistan. The present Zadari government and the
economy are tottering on the edge.
The Pakistani Army is fighting their own Taliban
for the future of the nation. It
is not clear if Pakistan will
regress to fundamentalism or become a modern,
unified state. There is little question that Pakistan offers de facto
secure sanctuary in both Baluchistan and the
FATA regions to the Quetta Shura and the Hekmatyar Taliban
factions.
4. GENERAL:
·
Afghanistan
and her 28 million people are trying to build the basic elements of a civil and
Islamic society while
traumatized by 35 years of cruel violence and
chaos. The country is a giant and beautiful land of great contrasts.
The natural leadership of the tribes has been
slaughtered (one million murdered) or driven into exile (three
million) first by the Soviets during their
terrible invasion and repression of the people---then by the Taliban as an
antidote to clan resistance to their unwelcome
and poisonous rule.
·
The Afghans
are such impressive, devout, generous, and energetic people. They have an acute sense of humor in
the face of relentless misery and
adversity. They are superb,
courageous soldiers and energetic, creative
businessmen. They have deep respect for learning and teachers---and a
thirst and gratitude for education and
knowledge even at the most elemental level. They
are intensely focused as students at any age and quick to learn
and adapt.
5.
THE MILITARY SITUATION -- THE BOTTOM LINE:
·
The Taliban
believe they are winning. The
Afghan people do not know who will prevail---their government or
the Taliban. The populations particularly the Pashtun are hedging their
bets. Most Afghans are also
dismayed at
the injustice and corruption of the government
(in particular the ANP) compared to the more disciplined and
Islamic Taliban. Taliban open internet
communications among themselves and their propaganda to the Afghan
people take into account their slogan that “the
West has the clocks…but the Taliban have the time.”
·
The Taliban
think they have the moral high ground.
They are richly funded with drug money. They are well
equipped and heavily armed. They have perfected massive anti-armor
IED’s. They are good at rapid and
effective information operations. They deal in
recent months with the Afghan people in a careful manner to avoid
the cruel images of their past oppression.
·
The Taliban
now have a serious presence in 160 Districts of 364--- up from 30 Districts in
2003. They have a
Shadow Government at Province level and most
Districts throughout the country. Insurgent attacks have
increased 60% in less than a year. In July alone they employed 828 IED
attacks against friendly forces.
We
should expect 5,700 IED attacks in total by
year’s end 2009. We must guard against tactical arrogance by US and
Allied ground combat forces.
·
Twice in
recent months we have seen battalion sized units of Taliban fighters conduct
highly successful (not-
withstanding catastrophic losses by the
attacking insurgents) complex attacks employing surprise, reconnaissance,
fire support, maneuver, and enormous courage in
an attempt to over run isolated US units. This is not Iraq. These
Taliban have a political objective to knock NATO
out of the war ---backed up by ferocious combat capabilities.
We must ensure that ISAF forces follow the
tactical basics of: fire support to always include supporting artillery,
6
intelligence oversight, OP/LP’s for early
warning, adequate reserves, and operate with appropriate tactical mass
against these very clever enemy fighters. Only
the incredible small unit leadership, fighting skill, and valor of
these two small US Army units ---which suffered
very high casualties at Wanat and COP Keating --- prevented a
humiliating disaster.
·
US, Allied
and ANA (Army)/ANP (Police) casualties have gone up dramatically. (The ANP take
the
overwhelming preponderance of the losses.
Apparently the Taliban take them very seriously as a potential threat
to their night control of villages.) As of 25
November US casualties are 922 killed and 4565 wounded. (Eight +
battalions killed or wounded). During the
expected Taliban and ISAF simultaneous spring offensives--- we may
well encounter ISAF casualty rates of 300-500 a
month.
·
ISAF is
reinforcing just in time to rescue the deteriorating tactical situation. Currently 42 nations provide 35,000
Non-US NATO troops (many with severe ROE
constraints or military competence issues). The current US force
level of 68,000 troops will increase per order
of President Obama on 2 December by as many as 33,000 additional
troops.
The Allies may well provide an additional 7000+ reinforcements. However, only the courageous Brit’s
will have both robust ROE and an aggressive
ground-air-logistics-SOF combat capability. The Canadians and the
Dutch will withdraw. The political support in
Germany for their Bundeswehr (extremely weak capabilities
because of very restrictive ROE) is on the verge
of collapse. The French are
extremely capable but in the field in
small numbers.
·
The Afghan
National Army is a growing success story. All five Maneuver Corps Headquarters
have been fielded
along with 14 of 19 Brigade Headquarters, and 82
of the 132 authorized ground combat battalions. (Kandaks). 46
of these battalions are rated as capable of
independent operations. Plans are
to take the ANA from 90,000 to
240,000 by 2013.
·
One of our
most capable combat leaders US Army LTG Bill Caldwell has been recently given
the task of building
the ANA and ANP Afghan security force. He has
already been assigned two US brigade training teams from the
82nd Abn Division and the 48th BCT of the GA NG. He will now command all NATO Training
establishment
forces.
As the units graduate from institutional training and deploy to the
Regional Commands to operate—they
will then fall under ISAF operational command.
More trainers will soon follow from elite US and NATO units.
·
The Afghan
National Police ANP (now 92,000 officers) are a work in progress. They are six
years behind the
ANA in development. The police are badly
equipped, corrupt (7,300 fired in last two years), and untrained (64 of
365 Police Districts have gone through
training.) The US Department of
Defense will now take total charge of
this program from State Department. It will take
a decade to create an Afghan National Police Force with
adequate integrity which can operate at village
level in a competent manner. It
will also require 1000 trained and
protected judges--- and a competent force of
prosecutors and defense lawyers.
Finally, we must create a
correction system so that convicted prisoners
can be incarcerated in a humane manner.
·
We have now
mostly fixed the disorganized NATO/US/Afghan military command and control
system.
Thankfully, Secretary Gates, Generals Dave
Petraeus at CENTCOM and General Stan McChrystal the ISAF
Commander (with the deft political-military
support of US Admiral Jim Stavridis the NATO Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe) have unscrewed this mess.
We now have a unifying theater strategic ISAF headquarters
commanded by General McChrystal. The next level of control is the tactical-operational
direction and
coordination of all allied and Afghan forces in
all four Regional Commands which is now in the hands of the very
experienced US combat leader LTG Dave Rodriguez
with the NATO (IJC) Intermediate Joint Command.
Petraeus and McChrystal are the most effective
counter-insurgency strategists and counter-terrorist fighters we
have produced in nine years of war.
·
We now have
finally rationalized and made coherent US and NATO airpower in
Afghanistan. This war would be
immediately unsustainable without the massive
employment of US Air Force, Navy (Carrier Battle Group
dedicated on station in the Indian Ocean),
Marine, and Army aviation power:
·
The air
power numbers are huge: ground attack (22,931CAS sorties year to date); UAV,
ISR, medevac, re-fueling
(15,438 tanker sorties year to date), and
transport assets (11,984 C17 sorties and 31,871 C130 sorties year to
date). Nearly 100% of troop personnel,
ammunition, sensitive items, and armored vehicles moved by air. (We
7
flew 2830 MRAP light armor vehicles into
Afghanistan in less than a year.
Now flying 7,000 MATV’ s).
Casualties move in and out of the battle zone by
air--three days time to return wounded soldiers to US with a 95%
survival rate. Isolated Army, Marine, and SOF units are resupplied with
food, water, fuel, building materials, and
humanitarian aid by precision airdrop from
altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet which land inside a 100 foot circle
with 95% precision. Air power is the glue that
holds together the war effort.
·
Afghanistan
and Iraq are an immensely costly war running in excess of $377 million a day in
FY10 Constant
dollars.
(WWII was $622 million per day.).
US Defense outlays for 2009 are $657 billion (or 4.6% of GDP…the
highest since 1992.) In FY 2009 the war in
Afghanistan cost $55.9 billion in regular appropriations with an
additional supplemental of $80.73 billion.
Clearly Afghanistan will run with a burn rate in excess of $9 billion per
month by the summer of 2010.
·
American
military values which were put at such risk during the Rumsfeld leadership era
of Abu Gharib have
now been restored by our senior military and
civilian leadership. My visit to the new Bagram Detention Facility
was enormously moving. 500+ detainees.
Most are released after 24 months.
They gain 46 lbs in confinement.
They learn to read in their native tongue at the
4th grade level. They are given the option of also
learning English
and almost all do. They receive vocational training and have access to a
distinguished Afghan Islamic scholar.
The US prison commander is a Texas National
Guard female Lt Colonel who is a lawyer, an MP, a mother and a
grandmother. She meets unguarded each day with the senior detainees,
sitting cross-legged in a circle (Shura) to
hear their views. The 18th Airborne Corps Military
Police Brigade Commander who has oversight command of
the facility talks to each detainee as they are
released. He is a hard nosed combat soldier. Invariably he tells me---
the detainees thank him and hug him goodbye.
·
All three
of our superb senior US-NATO dual-hatted combat leaders---General Stan
McChrystal, LTG Dave
Rodriquez, and LTG Bill Caldwell have called
upon the best and the brightest of the military services and the
inter-agency operators (FBI, DEA, AID, Border
Patrol, etc.) to rally to this Afghanistan campaign. We now have
the absolute best leaders in uniform, the CIA,
law enforcement, and State/US AID headed into Afghanistan to run
this operation.
6.
THE PROBLEMS FACING 40,000 AFGHAN VILLAGES:
·
Afghanistan
is still in the 14th Century. It is the fifth poorest nation on the face of the
earth. Basic services are
rudimentary or non-existent. The Afghans lack
infrastructure, justice, resources and the most basic forms of local
and national governance. Only 12 % of the land is arable and
they face grossly inadequate potable water, soil
degradation, massive deforestation, and severe
overgrazing.
·
Afghanistan
is the second most corrupt nation in the world after Somalia. Their adherence to
tribal and Islamic
values has been shattered by endless civil war
and foreign oppression. There is almost no civil or criminal justice.
Court trials last only minutes in many cases and
lack juries. Human rights
violations are endemic: extrajudicial
killings, official impunity, restrictions on
freedom of the press and religion, and severe and widespread child
abuse. The nation’s 34 provincial prisons and
203 detention centers are appalling. Prisoners are consistently
subject to torture and police frequently rape
female and male detainees.
·
Five
million children live in desperate poverty. 70% of the country is illiterate. Unemployment is
widespread.
40% of the country literally does not know where
their next meal will come from.
People starve or freeze to death
in the winter.
·
The lot of
women is dismal…87% complain of violence… half of it sexual….60% of marriages
are forced. The
education level is at four years. From a Western
perspective ---in the conservative rural areas (80% of the nation)
--- women are in many cases merely abused
property with less opportunity than a donkey.
·
General
life expectancy is under 45 years. Tuberculosis and drug addiction are
widespread. The country is
infested with 5-7 million land mines which have
disabled more than 200,000 Afghans.
8
·
Terrorism
and lack of basic physical security is widespread. The Taliban enforce a parallel system of justice
involving hangings, torture, beheadings and
beatings. Criminality and extortion on the nation’s road network is
omnipresent. Decades of warfare have left
property issues in great disorder.
·
The land is
mired in endless bloody civil war among the Pashtun (42%), the Tajiks (27%),
the Uzbeks (9%), the
Hazaras (9%), and the many others who speak
Dari, Pashto, and a polyglot of disparate languages. The frontiers
with Afghanistan’s six neighbor states are
uncertain and divide intensely felt tribal and ethnic affiliations.
7.
AFGHANISTAN NOW HAS HOPE:
·
The Afghan
nation has an elected President --Hamid Karzai --who is: brilliant, well
educated, non-violent, a
politically astute deal maker in a nation where
murder not compromise is the normal political tool; a man who
deeply cares for his people; and who is a
personally courageous Afghan patriot who is constantly at risk of
assassination (several near successful
attempts…probably from the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar insurgents in the FATA
region of Pakistan.). His popularity with his
own people has fallen dramatically as the Taliban have surged to
greater power in part because of the
ineffectiveness of his government.
·
Karzai is
also a national leader in a deeply divided nation who has the legitimacy that
comes from being part of
the dominant ethnic group (42% of the nation is
probably Pashtun) and the most prestigious tribe. President
Karzai is also committed to earning his place in
history as a transformer of his nation to a peaceful place in the
civilized world. He is under enormous personally
destructive and contradictory pressure from his Allies, the
Afghan people, and US representatives.
(Underweight, sick, nervous facial tic.) He is clearly imperfect. However,
there is no evidence I have seen that he is
personally corrupt in any way.
Like President Grant following the US
Civil War, he has a collection of ruffians in
his inner circle. Some of the Provincial Governors are murderous
felons. We in the international community have
handled him very stupidly and arrogantly at times.
·
Hamid
Karzai is trying to govern the transition of Afghanistan with a leadership
cadre which is a mixture of world
class expatriates (to include the current MOD
and MOI and several other cabinet level officials), many political
and bureaucratic and military leaders who are
courageous and devout but illiterate; and a collection of warlords,
thugs, and rascals ---which include some of his
own family (brother Ahmed Wali Karzai is reputed to be the straw
boss of Kandahar and a de facto drug king pin.)
---and also a smattering of dishonest international contractors.
·
The
overwhelming percentage of 124,000+ US and Allied NGO’s and contractors in
Afghanistan (to include
DynCorp whose Board of Directors I am proud to
be with) are men and women of integrity, energy, and talent
who are there at great personal sacrifice and
peril. They care deeply about
Afghanistan, they want an adventure,
and they need a paycheck. Without them the
entire war effort ---and most economic and political development
would grind to an immediate and total collapse.
·
The recent
Afghan Presidential election in this fragile, violent nation (with no history
of democracy or the rule of
law) was deeply flawed. The 30,000+ Taliban are
mostly Pashtun. They terrorized
the Pashtun plurality into not
voting.
Karzai’s dishonest campaign electoral machine then manufactured three
million ballots to make up for the
missing voters. However, given the realities of this troubled nation no one
else could possibly have won. The
US
and the UN proposed a runoff Presidential
election with the number two runner-up Mr. Abdullah (seen as the
Tajik candidate). This course-of-action would
have produced another delayed, murderous, freezing, expensive,
and equally unconvincing political charade.
·
We (the US,
UN, and EU) forced on this primitive country a constitution that has some form
of national election
EVERY YEAR EXCEPT THREE until the year 2023.
Could Florida handle this surfeit of democracy? We do
not find many examples of operative democracy
within 5000 miles of Kabul.
·
Afghanistan
has an elected bi-cameral legislature, a constitution, a growing road network
(90% of the Ring Road
is complete), and the rudiments of a disciplined
and courageous Army. (90,000 troops.) When we entered
Afghanistan on a punitive military expedition
following the murder of nearly 3000 Americans on “911” --the
Afghan nation was in a shattered condition. People were living in caves in the
rubble of Kabul. There were
9
nearly no institutions left standing except the
Taliban. Five million refugees have now returned since 2002
demonstrating with their presence hope for the
future...
·
The Taliban
are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population. Even
among the Pashtun they
command polling support of less than 6%. The Taliban were the spiritually pure,
they held the moral high
ground, they dispensed immediate dispute
resolution, they normally were disciplined and anti-crime. They were
also a malignant virus in this sick
society. They were the uneducated,
murderous, rural hicks who destroyed the
culture and invented a cruel form of Islam not
normal to this devout but tolerant society. They were anti-history.
They turned Afghanistan into a nightmare for
women, for other ethnic minorities, and for the Shia Hazaras. They
were senselessly cruel and destructive. Only the Soviets were worse.
·
The
Afghan’s are generally extremely grateful for US and international
presence. US/NATO forces have a
60%+
favorability rating in the polls. (US poll
numbers are lower in the UK, South Korea, Germany and Japan.) All four
recent Afghan Presidential candidates publicly
endorsed and supported the US presence. However, the Afghans
are extremely apprehensive that we will leave
again…sinking them back to the chaos of endless civil war.
·
Social
indicators have dramatically increased for the better since the end of the
Taliban’s cruel era. Access to
basic health care has rocketed from 8% in 2001
to 79%. 83% of the children are
immunized. Child mortality has
been reduced by 25%. TB deaths are down by 50%.
Seven million children are in school to include three million
girls -- up from one million students and zero
girls during the Taliban rule.
·
The
repression of human communication and thought during the Taliban has been
reduced dramatically. Eight
million people have phones. There are 650 active
print publications reflecting differing political views. There are
15 television networks and 55 private radio
stations. There are also 150+
private printing houses and 145 media
and film production companies. People and
commerce now move constantly day and night (albeit at frequent risk
of criminal or Taliban attack) across the Afghan
frontiers with their six neighbor states.
·
The economy
is climbing from zero to rudimentary.
The legal economy is growing at 10% per year. The
Afghans have rapidly created effective
businesses that do: light manufacturing, crafts, construction, trucking, and
road building. The agricultural system is painfully trying to repair the
damage of 30 years of war and the
competition of opium planting for scarce arable
land. The Afghan goal is to feed
the population and again
become a breadbasket for SW Asia. Educational
institutions to include universities and vocational training
programs are appearing across the country. Large deposits of iron, copper, gold,
gas, and gemstones are in the
initial stages of exploration and
exploitation. Hydroelectric
electrical power is coming on line.
·
Violence
against the people has been dramatically reduced as the Taliban learned both in
Afghanistan and the
Pakistani tribal areas that they will have a
fatal kinetic encounter with ISAF ground combat units if they mass in
sizable numbers in daylight or dark---OR if
discovered by US airpower to include Predator/Reaper armed
UAV’s.
The death rate among Afghan civilians is way down since the new ISAF
Commander General
Mc
