HQ To Marines In Afghanistan: Sleep In A Hole
By David Wood
Yes, "sleep in a hole," was
essentially the response of Gen. James Conway, commandant of the United
States Marine Corps, when I asked him Tuesday afternoon whether he has
enough "infrastructure'' to feed and house the 20,000 Marines who will
be in southern Afghanistan by early summer.
"We do not,'' Conway said.
He went on to say that Marines
can live comfortably in what to other people looks like a moonscape.
Just recently, Conway visited a Marine in Helmand Province who was
sleeping in a hole in the ground – "below the shrapnel line,'' Conway
assured me.
"And he was perfectly happy,'' the commandant added with a straight face.
Now, I have lived with Marines
in holes dug in the ground. Some holes are elaborate, and provide some
small comfort between firefights and adequate protection from exploding
mortars and rockets. But I have not noticed any Marines being
"perfectly happy" in such circumstances (And even if, as Conway pointed
out at a Pentagon briefing, the enemy in Afghanistan doesn't enjoy
sumptuous dining halls and gyms, nor do many ordinary Afghan people.)
Conway was enjoying a
modest dig at the Army and the U.S. Central Command, which has issued a
directive saying no troops can be sent to Afghanistan until additional
living facilities are constructed. ("That's not a description of the
United States Marine Corps,'' Conway huffed.)
But his insistence that
Marines can live in the dirt (and prefer it!) raises an important point
about the cost of the new strategy and the "surge'' of 30,000 troops
announced two weeks ago by President Obama. Most of the additional
troops being sent to Afghanistan are not Marines and will not be living
in the dirt.
Just at Bagram Air Field, the
major U.S. air hub, contractors are just completing huge concrete
apartment complexes for Air Force personnel who are vacating
undesirable prefab housing. (At Bagram, the Burger King outlet
home-delivers!) Most soldiers lived in less desirable circumstances,
many in tents that in Afghan summers are stifling and in winter,
freezing. At remote outposts, many soldiers live in what could
charitably be described as plywood shacks.
Even those cost money,
however, along with the pretty decent chow that most military people
enjoy in Afghanistan . Thirty thousand more people is a pretty heavy
and expensive footprint. In the absence of a better cost estimate,
Washington is figuring on about $30 billion a year added cost for the
"surge,'' but no one seems to put much credence in that number. The $30
billion is in addition to the $68 billion the administration has asked
for to fund operations in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010.
Neither figure includes the
cost of what the military calls, somewhat deceptively, "life support''
for the surge reinforcements headed for Afghanistan this spring and
summer. Both numbers are based on past experience, and given past
experience in Afghanistan and the Pentagon's record of estimating and
controlling costs, I wouldn't bet against that number growing even
larger. According to Todd Harrison, an analyst at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent Washington think
tank, it costs about $1 million to keep one troop in Afghanistan for
one year. That is substantially higher than the cost in Iraq , where,
at the height of the Bush administration's "surge'' in 2007, it cost
$685,000 per troop per year.
Afghanistan is more
expensive because it's hard to get to and hard to get around in. The
equipment for a light infantry combat brigade, like the 10th Mountain
Division's 1st Brigade, for example, includes vehicles and spare
transmissions and tires, but also computers, medical and dental
supplies and equipment, water purification equipment, cash, and
thousands of other items packed in heavy steel containers and either
flown in or shipped by rail to a seaport, transported by freighter to
Karachi, Pakistan, and trucked over some of the world's most
treacherous roads.
Fuel, according to a study
cited by Harrison , costs $25 to $45 per gallon delivered – when the
trucks are not hijacked by the Taliban -- and the U.S. military in
Afghanistan consumes 8,000 gallons of it per troop per year. Another
factor will inflate that $30 billion guesstimate: Defense Department
strategists expect the Taliban to fight back this spring and summer
with more IEDs and by attacking Afghan government facilities in places
where there are few U.S. troops. Both tactics will increase U.S. costs.
Additional aircraft will be needed for surveillance, money will be
needed for costly jammers and other devices, and troops will have to be
moved to the areas where the Taliban are attacking.
All these costs are reasonably
straightforward. More worrisome are the less visible costs that are
inexorably swelling the defense budget.
America 's professional
army is acclaimed as the world's best, and that doesn't come cheap. The
Pentagon has managed to attract and keep good people by offering
terrific benefits, including enlistment bonuses, high quality health
care, and a lifetime pension after only 20 years of service (pension
payments are kept off the Pentagon's books and hidden elsewhere in the
U.S. budget). Military health care costs over $47 billion a year,
nearly 10 percent of the Pentagon's base budget, Harrison figures. He
projects that the military health care bill will nearly double every
ten years. Another less visible cost is for replacing the equipment
that's gotten busted or worn out in combat over the past eight years. A
lot of it has simply become obsolete, like the thinly-armored Humvees
originally sent to Iraq . Equipment that still works is being shipped
from Iraq direct to Afghanistan , rather than being shipped home to be
refurbished.
Many of these costs are put
off from year to year and never funded. For the Marine Corps alone, the
backlog of unfunded equipment needs is $15 billion. "It's started to
reach a little bit of crisis proportions,'' Conway said Tuesday.
All of this budget analysis,
and all other discussions of defense spending, is based on unreliable
data, according to the Government Accountability Office, the
independent fiscal watchdog agency of Congress. The GAO has been at the
Pentagon's throat for two decades trying to get it to clean up what the
GAO delicately calls "management weakness'' in figuring out how much it
is spending and what it's getting for the money. In part, because of
high turnover at the Pentagon, financial management problems have never
been fixed. The upshot is the defense budget goes up, Congress cuts
where it's the easiest, and the troops often come out on the short end.
This fall, the GAO examined
the Pentagon's own oversight agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA). It found widespread violations of GAGAS, which are Generally
Accepted Government Accounting Standards. GAO gumshoes looked at 14
DCAA audits and 62 pricing reports and found that each one smelled.
For example, the GAO and the
Pentagon's inspector general's office uncovered a case in which a DCAA
auditor, examining a major Pentagon contract, came across
irregularities and was pressured to ignore them. A DCAA bureaucrat
ordered his auditors to overlook the problems and the contractor was
paid over $100 million on the contract. No indication of who squealed,
but the incident is already subject of a criminal investigation. Maybe
the perps should be sent to Afghanistan to live in a hole.